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This paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates
regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality, public
health, highway safety, and the provision of local public goods. Voters
have single-peaked preferences along a single policy dimension. There
are two levels of government, federal and local. The federal level can
constrain local policy by mandating a minimum (or maximum) policy.
Localities are free to adopt any policy satisfying the constraint imposed
by the federal mandate. We show that voters choose federal mandates
that are too strict, which leads to excessively severe mandates. We show
that similar results can obtain when federal provision of the public-
provided good is more efficient than local provision.
I. Introduction
Many policies are determined through a combination of decisions at
various levels of government. Policy makers at a higher level of govern-
ment specify guidelines that must be satisfied by policies decided at
lower levels. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency estab-
lishes emissions standards for gasoline-powered vehicles, which may then
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be strengthened (but not relaxed) by each state. Other examples include
educational curriculum and service requirements and highway and
workplace safety standards. Some kinds of government expenditures also
follow this pattern: for example, the federal government provides basic
welfare support to poor families with children, which is often supple-
mented by state welfare grants; federal income taxes are determined by
Congress, and additional income taxes can be imposed by states and
municipalities. The same pattern can be found in the European Union,
where, for instance, the European Court of Justice imposes minimum
standards of respect for certain human rights or the European Com-
mission imposes a minimum amount of competition in network
industries.
Observers often complain that the constraints imposed by central
levels of government on local levels are too strict. More precisely, there
are circumstances in which central governments intervene even when
interjurisdictional externalities are minimal, in which case such inter-
vention is difficult to explain in terms of efficiency gains. Consider, for
instance, the fact that grants given by the U.S. government to states for
maintenance of highways are reduced if they do not raise the drinking
age to 21, or the fact that U.S. regulations require local governments
to move city fuel tanks above ground (Peterson 1995). Following the
lead of the public choice school, most economists and political scientists
would, we surmise, interpret this excessive intervention by central gov-
ernments as the consequence of power grabbing by politicians.
The main message of this paper is that such excessive interference
has deeper roots. It is a “normal” consequence of the behavior of voters
and a probably unavoidable feature of federal systems. Local political
fights have a tendency to spill over at the federal level, as voters will try
to have their preferred policy imposed at both levels of government.
Recent political debates in the European Union provide many examples:
the staunchest defenders of “subsidiarity”1 on some issues become ar-
dent advocates of European intervention on others. A report to the
French Senate (La Male`ne 1996/97) gives striking examples. For in-
stance, through a resolution of November 18, 1992, the European Par-
liament has expressed its support to the principle of subsidiarity. This
did not prevent its Environmental Commission from complaining when
a text on the reduction of water pollution by water mills was withdrawn
from the agenda.
In order to study mandates, we examine the equilibrium of a hier-
archical pattern of policy making in which, at each level, decisions are
1 Subsidiarity is a general principle of European law, which states that, except in the
areas in which it has exclusive competence, the European Community intervenes only as
far as the objectives of the policy that is considered cannot be reached by the member
states.
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made by majority vote. We identify the equilibrium effects of multiple
layers of government and compare the outcomes under the hierarchical
system of mandates to the outcomes that arise if policies are determined
either exclusively at the federal level or exclusively at the local level.
Our model is based on the standard one-dimensional spatial model,
in which voters have single-peaked preferences and political competition
produces median voter outcomes. Policies at both the federal and state
levels are determined according to majority rule equilibrium. The fed-
eral mandate is set in the first stage, and it becomes a lower bound to
the policy choice of each district in the second stage.
We first consider a baseline case, without externalities or other pos-
sible sources of efficiency gains from federal intervention. We find that
voters will vote sincerely at each stage, and therefore there will be stricter
standards with the hierarchical structure than with a system in which
policy is determined entirely at the local level. Furthermore, there will
be less variance of policy outcomes across local jurisdictions. More voters
are made worse off than better off, compared to a world without federal
mandates.
We then extend the model to allow for efficiency gains from federal
intervention. We do this by modeling the local public good outcome as
the sum of a level provided by the federal government (similar to a
mandate) plus whatever additional amount the district chooses to pro-
duce locally. Local production of the public good is assumed to be less
efficient than production by the federal government because of econ-
omies of scale (or scope) or greater efficiency of federal taxation. Even
with significant efficiency gains from federal provision, majority voting
can still lead to a higher level of provision than would be optimal under
a utilitarian welfare criterion. Finally, we show that, surprisingly, the
level of federal expenditures will be higher the more efficient the local
governments are at providing public goods.
While our framework is, as far as we know, entirely new to the liter-
ature, a number of papers touch on related issues. Bednar (1998) and
de Figueiredo and Weingast (1997) investigate and discuss the impacts
of and pressures leading to federal encroachment of the kind that has
preoccupied constitutional scholars and designers for centuries. In the
public finance literature, Nechyba (1997a, 1997b) has studied equilib-
rium properties of financing locally public projects through a combi-
nation of income taxes (which normally occur at state or national levels)
and property taxes (which normally are imposed by local authorities).
There is also a vast literature in the field of regulation that addresses
the specific effects of federal standards in a variety of applied settings
including product safety, air and water quality, public health standards,
and other policy domains. However, none of this formally models the
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interaction of federal regulatory agencies and regulatory authorities at
lower levels of government.2
The theory presented in this paper is mostly positive, but it should
inform normative theories, as illustrated by the comparison of the ef-
ficiency regimes of different federalist regimes of Section IV. We discuss
this link, as well as the relationship to a broader research program, in
Section V.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section
II presents the basic model and results. Section III explores the exten-
sion to allow for efficiency gains from federal provision. Section IV
presents an extended parametric example that illustrates the welfare
properties of the equilibrium. Section V discusses directions for further
research.
II. The Basic Model
We consider a confederation composed of D districts, where D is an odd
integer equal to at least three. Each district has an odd number of voters.
Voters have complete and transitive preferences over the policy space
R1; the preferences of voter —that is, voter i in district d—are(i, d)
represented by the utility function where is the policyi 1U (x ), x P Rd d d
outcome in district d, and is his or her ideal policy.it p arg max U (x)id x d
These preferences are single-peaked: is strictly increasing on (2`,iUd
tid] and strictly decreasing on [tid, 1`).
The median ideal policy in district d is The medianm p med {t }.d (i,d) id
ideal policy for all voters in all districts will be called M. To simplify the
exposition we assume that no two voters have the same ideal policy. We
make no specific assumptions about the correlation of preferences
across or within districts. In particular, we do not rule out the kind of
correlation of preferences that might naturally arise because of sorting
a` la Tiebout.
A. Federal Mandate Chosen by Referendum
Voting takes place in two stages: first a federal mandate is chosen, and
second each district chooses its own policy, constrained by this mandate.
Voters are assumed to have no specific information about the other
voters, and our results rely on dominant strategies.
Formally, the voting game is modeled as the following two-stage ma-
joritarian game, in which at each stage each voter announces an ideal
policy. The one-stage version of the game we use was first studied by
2 There does exist a literature on the structure of overlapping regulatory authority,
focusing on specific applications.
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Moulin (1980), who showed that a mechanism that chooses a policy
that is the median of the declared favored policy of the voters is “straight-
forward,” in the sense that it offers no opportunities for the voters to
manipulate it, regardless of their belief about the strategies of other
voters (see also Border and Jordan 1983).
Stage 1: Each voter announces a policy, A federal standard, F, isˆF .id
set equal to the median of the announced policies: ˆF p med{F }.id
Stage 2: In each district, given the federal standard F chosen in the
first stage, each voter announces a proposed policy in [F, 1`), and the
policy xd implemented in district d is the median of the policies an-
nounced at this stage.
The key feature of this game is that outcomes are driven by the median
voter in each stage. It is meant to represent outcomes resulting from
competitive behavior under majority rule. Some minor variations on
this rule could be used. For example, similar results are obtained if the
outcome was determined by, say, rather than or, moreF p M/2 F p M
generally, if F is any strictly increasing function of M. Voter equilibrium
strategies would adjust to compensate for the difference.
To identify the equilibrium of this game, we first show that the second
stage of this voting scheme is strategy-proof (it is an equilibrium to have
all voters vote their ideal policy) for any outcome of the first stage. We
then show that in the first stage players have a unique dominant strategy
given that other players’ reports in the second stage are truthful.3 This
finding that in equilibrium voters do not strategically underreport their
preferences in the first stage of the game (setting the federal mandate)
plays a central role in driving our results.
We call this a sequentially dominant strategy equilibrium. We denote by
the equilibrium outcomes in the two stages and by∗ ∗ ∗(F , x , … , x )1 D
the equilibrium outcome of stage 2 in district d if the outcome∗x (F )d
of stage 1 is F.
The unique equilibrium outcome of the game is described in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. The equilibrium outcome of the two-stage voting game
is a standard equal to the mean of the types of all voters, and∗F p M,
an outcome in each district equal to the maximum of M and the district
median, ∗x p max {M, m }.d d
This theorem states that at the federal stage, voters vote for their
3 This equilibrium seems very natural, but there are other equilibria that are reasonable
if we change our assumptions about the information of the voters. Assume, for instance,
that in the first stage voters know md precisely. Then, even if they predict sincere voting
in the second stage, all votes in [0, md] are undominated in the first stage of the game
for voters whose type is smaller than md. We feel that the equilibrium used in this section,
which requires minimum information from the voters, is the most reasonable selection.
Using others would not affect our substantive conclusions.
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preferred policy, as though there were no second local stage: there is
no strategic underreporting of preferences. The formal proof is pre-
sented in the Appendix, but its basic idea is simple. First, because pref-
erences are single-peaked on it is a dominant strategy for voters[F, 1 `),
to vote for their ideal policy in the second stage of the game. In the
first stage, if then voter (i, d) would like F to be as close ast 1 m ,id d
possible to his or her ideal policy and cannot do better than voting
truthfully in the first stage. (Recall that voters do not know whether
or ) On the other hand, if then voter (i, d) carest 1 m t ! m . t ! m ,id d id d id d
only that F be smaller than md, and in order to obtain this, he or she
might as well vote tid. Hence, whatever the relationship between tid and
md, a voter cannot do better than voting tid.
Theorem 1 enables us to prove several interesting properties of the
equilibria that help understand the consequences of the presence of a
federal level.
Property 1. For every district, and for at least one district,∗x ≥ m ,d d
∗x 1 m .d d
That is, the effect of federal mandates is to weakly increase the policy
level in every district and strictly increase the policy in at least one
district. The districts in which federal mandates lead to a strict increase
are those low-demand districts with Because we have assumedm ! M.d
that no two voters share the same ideal policy, that every district has an
odd number of voters, and that there are at least three districts, there
exists at least one low-demand district, with and hencem ! M, x 1d d
m .d
We now turn to the consequences of these facts for the welfare of
voters.
Property 2. Voters in high-demand districts in which arem 1 Md
unaffected by a federal mandate.
In high-demand districts, the outcome is the same outcome∗x p md d
that would arise without a federal mandate.
Property 3. A voter for whom is made weakly worse off by at ≤ mid d
federal mandate. If this voter is made strictly worse off.m ! M,d
This property follows from the fact that federal mandates do not lower
the policy in any district. A locally low-demand voter would be(t ! m )id d
better off only if the federal mandate actually lowered the local policy,
which can never happen. If, in addition, this locally low-demand voter
resides in a low-demand district, then the federal mandate produces a
strict increase in the local policy, which makes the voter strictly worse
off.
Property 4. Voters for whom are made strictly better offm ! M ≤ td id
by a federal mandate.
The logic behind this is analogous to the logic behind property 3,
but with an additional twist. A locally high-demand voter is(t 1 m )id d
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made better off if the federal mandate raises the local policy, but only
if it does not raise it too much. If this locally high-demand voter resides
in a low-demand district, then the federal mandate produces a strict
increase in the local policy, which makes the voter strictly better off,
and if the voter’s type is greater than the overall median, the federal
mandate certainly increases his or her utility.
Property 5. Voters for whom may be either better off orm ! t ! Md id
worse off with a federal mandate.
If the mandate produces an outcome greater than tid.m ! t ! M,d id
Since preferences are single-peaked and md and M lie on opposite sides
of voter t’s ideal policy, the utility derived from policy M (resulting from
the federal mandate) can be either greater or less than the utility derived
from policy md.
Property 6. There are more voters that are made worse off by a
federal mandate than there are voters that are made better off.
By property 2, voters in high-demand districts are unaffected by man-
dates. Therefore, only voters from low-demand districts are affected.
From property 1 there is at least one low-demand district, and from
property 3 more than half of the voters from such districts (those for
whom ) are made worse off.t ≤ mid d
Property 6 can be interpreted as a negative verdict on the welfare
consequences of federal mandates in our framework. Given that the
standard approach to constitutional design in economics and in social
choice theory is to look for constitutions that maximize some measure
of welfare, this result begs the question of the reason for the presence
of federal mandates in the first place. One immediate answer is that it
would be impossible to constitutionally rule out federal intervention in
policy areas with little or no economic benefit to federal intervention
while encouraging it in policy areas with greater economic benefits from
intervention. The problem is simply that it is very difficult to provide
ex ante a delimitation between those issues that are genuinely motivated
by the presence of significant economic benefits from intervention and
those issues that are not. In either case, “high-demand” voters would
pressure for federal intervention. Thus, regardless of the care with which
such lines would be drawn, some issues will be open to federal inter-
vention even with minimal external benefits or economies. La Male`ne
(1996/97) provides an example of this tendency of local political fights
to spill over at the federal level. In 1994, the delegation for Europe of
the French Chambre des De´pute´s judged that a proposed European
directive on poverty was contrary to the principle of subsidiarity. When
a resolution to the effect came to the floor, it was impossible to direct
the debate away from the substantial issues involved toward the consti-
tutional aspects, and the Chambre approved the proposed directive.
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B. Federal Mandate Chosen by a Representative Legislature
We have assumed that the federal standard was chosen by a mechanism
in which all voters from all districts vote. In many settings federal policies
are actually chosen by representative legislative bodies. This will also
lead to excessive federal intervention. In order to study this issue, we
introduce a variation of our model in which each district elects a rep-
resentative, and these representatives vote on the federal standard. This
adds a stage to our basic game as follows:
Stage 1: Each voter announces a policy, and the median vote in each
district is used as the district’s vote for the federal mandate.4
Stage 2: The federal mandate, F, is given by the median of the median
votes of each district.
Stage 3: In each district, each voter votes for a policy in [F, 1`), and
the policy xd implemented in district d is the median of the votes at this
stage.
Because the third stage of the game is the same as above, it is still
true that voters will vote for their ideal policy. We show in the Appendix
that in the first stage (when they vote for their representative) voters
still have a dominant strategy to vote for their true ideal policy. The
intuition behind this result is very similar to the intuition behind the-
orem 1. The only difference is that the interval in which the voter can
move F is determined by the district to which he or she belongs.
This implies that the federal standard is equal to the median of the
median types of each district:
dM p med(m , m , … , m ).1 2 D
Theorem 2. Theorem 1 and properties 1–3 hold, with M replaced by
Md.
Depending on the distribution of types, Md can be smaller than, equal
to, or greater than M. To see this, consider a simple example with three
districts each containing three voters. Suppose that the ideal points are
aligned as follows:
t ! t ! t ! t ! t ! t ! t ! t ! t . (1)11 12 13 21 22 32 31 23 33
Hence, for all d (i.e., voter (2, d) is the median voter in districtm p td 2d
d) and Next, suppose that t31 were the leftmost
dM p M p m p t .2 22
ideal point instead of the third from the rightmost ideal point. Then
we would have Similarly, if were the rightmostdM p t ! M p t . t21 22 13
ideal point instead of the third from the leftmost ideal point, then we
would have dM p t 1 M p t .32 22
4 One could also interpret this as the outcome of a competitive two-party election for
a representative. The majority rule equilibrium outcome of such an election would be the
same as the dominant strategy outcome of this game.
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III. Substitution between Federal and Local Policy
In this section, we study a particular application of federal mandates,
in which there is a local public good that is provided by a combination
of federal and local expenditures. There are many examples of this,
such as police and public safety, education, and transportation infra-
structure. While some of these applications involve more than two levels
of government funding decisions, the basic ideas can be captured by a
simple modification of our two-layer model of the previous section. This
enables us to address questions about the relative efficiency of federal
versus local provision of local public goods, a subject of much interest
in the fiscal federalism literature.
A. Perfect Substitution
To avoid considerations of income redistribution, we assume that all
citizens pay the same taxes. More precisely, all citizens of the federation
pay the same federal taxes, and two citizens in the same district pay the
same local taxes. Consider first a model in which the net utility of voter
(i, d) is
u (z ) 2 (s 1 y ), (2)id d d
where is the amount of public service in district d, is thez ≥ 0 s ≥ 0d
per capita federal tax, and is the per capita local tax in districty ≥ 0d
d. The utility function uid is strictly concave, differentiable, and increas-
ing. It satisfies the Inada conditions and′ ′u (0) p 1` lim u (s) pid sr1` id
0.
Public services are produced thanks to federal and local expenditures,
which are perfect substitutes: z p s 1 y .d d
If voter (i, d) were a dictator, he would choose an amount of public
service tid that satisfies
′u (t ) p 1, (3)id id
and he would not care whether this was provided through federal or
local funds. We assume that for all ′ ′t ( t (i, d) ( (i , d ).id i ′d ′
The federal and local policies are chosen through the following two-
stage game:
Stage 1: Each voter announces a proposed federal policy, and asˆ,
federal policy s is determined by ˆs p med{s }.id
Stage 2: In each district, given the federal policy s chosen in the first
stage, voters announce a proposed local policy, that is, a total amount
of public goods to be provided in district d. The district will havez ≥ sd
to raise per capita taxes The local policy zd that is implementedz 2 s.d
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in district d is the median of the policies proposed by its voters at this
stage.5
It is straightforward to see that this game is strategically equivalent
to the game studied in Section II. It is sufficient to think of s as the
federal standard and as the policy implemented in district d.s 1 yd
Hence all the results discussed earlier hold.
A similar model would apply to “unfunded mandates,” that is, federal
laws that impose on local governments’ minimum expenditures. It is
sufficient to reinterpret s as the level of these unfunded mandates.
B. Local Provision Less Efficient than Public Provision
Up to now, we have worked with models in which there exists no reason
to have a federal policy. Federal expenditures are sometimes defended
on the grounds that they are more efficient than local expenditures.
For instance, while discussing the decentralization of investment of in-
frastructure in developing countries, Smith and Shin (1995) write that
“many infrastructure activities require large capital investments and ex-
hibit significant scale economies. Some decentralized jurisdictions may
be smaller than the minimum efficient size for particular activities” (p.
55).
To study the implications of such efficiency differences, we modify
the utility function (2) and assume that it is of the type
u (s 1 ay ) 2 (s 1 by ),id d d
where represents the relative efficiency of local spendinga P (0, 1]
compared to public spending (a dollar of local spending increases the
production of public goods by only a dollars) and represents theb ≥ 1
relative efficiency of local tax collection (a dollar of local tax collection
decreases welfare by b dollars).
We assume that at least one of the two inequalities anda ! 1 b 1 1
holds, so that there are positive reasons for federal expenditures. Oth-
erwise, the game proceeds in the same way as in Section IIIA.
It is convenient to define two “types” for voter (i, d): a federal type
ft p arg max [u (z) 2 z],id id
z
which is his or her preferred level of public services if they were provided
exclusively with federal funds, and a local type
5 We would obtain the same results if voters voted on per capita local expenditures yd.
Our formulation simplifies the analysis of Sec. IIIB.
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z
lt p arg max u (z) 2 b ,id id[ ]az
which is his or her preferred supplies of public services if they were
provided exclusively with local funds. We have
b′ l ′ fu (t ) p 1 1 p u (t ),id id id id
a
which, by concavity of uid, implies We assume that the ’s and
l f lt ! t . tid id id
the ’s are all different from each other.ft id
If the federal standard is s, the preferred local policy of voter (i, d)
is which implies local expenditures equal tol lmax (s, t ), max (0, t 2id id
s).
The following lemma states formally the fact that any voter prefers
that whatever level of public service is implemented be implemented
as much as possible through federal spending.
Lemma 1. If and we have′ ′ ′s 1 ay p s 1 ay p z s 1 s ,d d d
′ ′u (z ) 2 (s 1 y ) 1 u (z ) 2 (s 1 y ).id d d id d d
Proof. We have
′z 2 s z 2 xd d′y p 1 p y ,d d
a a
and therefore Q.E.D.′ ′s 1 by ! s 1 by .d d
It is clear that, given any federal standard, s, chosen in the first stage,
every voter has a dominant strategy to vote for a local policy equal to
in the second stage of the game. Note that a voter couldlmax (s, t )id
wish that federal expenditures were higher and still not vote for addi-
tional local expenditures, since increasing public services through local
funds is more expensive than increasing them through federal funds.
This implies that given a federal policy s, the policy implemented in
district d is
l lmed[max (s, t )] p max (s, m ),id d
where l lm { med(t ).d id
Since this expression depends on the median in district d, we need
to modify slightly our assumption about what each voter knows. Spe-
cifically, we assume that voters know the median ideal point of the other
voters in their district. We are now ready to prove the following theorem,
which describes the first-stage strategy of the voters.
Theorem 3. In the first stage, the unique dominant strategy of voter
(i, d) is to vote for the policy l fmax (m , t ).d id
The details of the proof are provided in the Appendix, but its basic
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idea can be sketched quite easily. Fix all votes except that of (i, d) and
let [s2, s1] denote the range of policies that can be median outcomes
for all possible votes (i, d) could submit. If the outcomel 2 1m ¸ [s , s ],d
will in any case be F. It is in the interest of the voter to make F as close
to as possible, which he can do by the rule above. Iff l 2 1t m P [s , s ],id d
the voter can force any local policy in the interval and thereforel 1[m , s ]d
can do no better than the rule above. Uniqueness is established by
showing that for any other rule there exists some configuration of other
voters that would make that other rule suboptimal.
The following technically obvious corollary states that changes that
on efficiency grounds should favor the substitution of local expenditures
for federal expenditures have the exact opposite effect.
Corollary 1. As local expenditures become more efficient, that is,
as b decreases or a increases, the equilibrium federal standard F
increases.
In particular, as both a and b converge to one, both the federal type
and the local type of voter (i, d) converge to as defined byf lt t t ,id id id
equation (3), and voter (i, d)’s vote converges to Thismax (m , t ).d id
implies, in particular, that the limiting federal standard is greater than
or equal to both M and Md. For instance, if the tid’s satisfy (1), it is equal
to On the other hand, ifdM p M .
t ! t ! t ! t ! t ! t ! t ! t ! t ,11 12 13 21 22 32 31 23 33
then whereas the limit federal standard is t32.
dM p M p m p t ,2 22
This suggests that it will be difficult to establish general welfare results
about federal standards: clearly in this case there are good reasons to
have federal standards. However, if we aggregate welfare, when a and
b are close to one, the optimal federal policy is basically equal to the
lowest median types among all the districts, but, as shown in the previous
paragraph, the equilibrium policy will be much larger than this. The
next section studies the welfare effects of federal mandates in more
detail.
IV. The Welfare Effects of Federal Mandates
In this section, we consider two examples in order to make specific
welfare comparisons between three different federal/local fiscal re-
gimes: (1) only local provision, (2) only federal provision, and (3) mixed
provision (both federal and local). The aim of the examples is to illus-
trate the range of effects induced by the presence of two levels of
government.
To simplify the calculations, we approximate a large number of voters
in a large number of districts by assuming a continuum of districts and
a continuum of voters. We assume that the conditional measure of voters
federal mandates 917
is the same in each district, so that each district is effectively the same
size.
Districts differ from each other only by the distribution of ideal pol-
icies: The net utility functions of all voters have the quasi-linear form
i ln (s 1 y ) 2 (s 1 by ),d d
where, as explained in Section III, s is the per capita level of the public
good provided by the federal government in each district, and yd is the
per capita level of the public good locally provided by district d. The
preferences of agent (i, d) do not depend on his district (but the dis-
tributions of i will differ among districts), and i indexes his or her
strength of preference for the public good. We refer to i as the type of
voter (i, d). Below, we explore how federal and local expenditures vary
as a function of b and of the distribution of preferences within and
across districts.
We shall see that the distributions of types within and between districts
affect crucially the relative social welfare induced by the three different
possible constitutions. Furthermore, the social welfare in the constitu-
tion with both a federal and a local level does not vary monotonically
with b. Indeed, an increase in b has two effects, which work in opposite
directions: (1) it decreases welfare by making local provision of public
goods more expensive, and (2) it increases welfare by diminishing the
upward distortion to s.
A. Example 1
The parameter d, which indexes districts, is uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. In district d, voter types (i.e., the i’s) are distributed uniformly
on the interval (0, d]. To compare the different regimes, we first use
the results of the previous section to derive the induced preferences
and voting behavior under the three regimes. Then we compare the
expected welfare of each regime as a function of the efficiency param-
eter, b, by integrating over the distribution of districts and types. Details
of the computation are given in the Appendix.
Induced preferences.—Regime 1 (local): Voter (i, d)’s ideal point is
Regime 2 (federal): Voter (i, d)’s ideal point is i. Regime 3 (mixed):i/b.
Voter (i, d) has a dominant strategy in the first round equal to
since (i, d)’s district median is equal to Given s,max [i, d/2b] d/2b.
the outcome of the first round, he or she has a dominant strategy in
the second round equal to max [(i/b) 2 s, 0].
District outcomes.—Given the induced preferences and voting behavior,
the equilibrium district outcomes in the three regimes are as follows:
Regime 1 (local): and Regime 2 (federal): s { overalls p 0, y p d/2b.d
median ≈ 0.19, and Regime 3 (mixed): If theny p 0. b ! 2.67,d
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Fig. 1.—This figure shows the social welfare associated with the three possible consti-
tutions in example 1. The thick line represents the welfare of a “local governments” only
constitution, the dashed horizontal line that of a “central government” only constitution,






y p max , .d [ ]ln (2be) 2b
If then andb 1 2.67, s ≈ 0.19 y p max [0.19, d/2b].d
Aggregate welfare.—The comparison of aggregate welfare under the
three regimes is shown in figure 1, which illustrates four points. First,
the regime with only federal spending is never optimal. Second, if fed-
eral spending is only slightly more cost-efficient than local spending,
then the “only local” regime is optimal. Third, if the cost advantage of
federal spending is sufficiently great, then the mixed regime is optimal.
Fourth, in the mixed regime, welfare is not monotonic in b.
B. Example 2
In example 1, the distribution of types is skewed toward low levels. In
this example, we consider a distribution of types that is symmetric
around 0.50. Districts are indexed by d, uniformly distributed in [0,
0.50]. Within each district, voters are indexed by Utilityi P [d, d 1 0.50].
functions are the same as in example 1; therefore, our two examples
federal mandates 919
Fig. 2.—The equilibrium level of federal expenditures in the mixed system as a function
of b in example 2.
share the same basic structure of preferences but have a different dis-
tribution of types.
Federal.—The distribution of the types of voters is triangular, and the
median vote with only federal provision is 0.50. Aggregate welfare is
20.85.
Local.—If there is only local provision, the median vote in district d
is and aggregate welfare is Therefore,(d 1 0.25)/b 20.83 2 0.50 ln b.
only federal provision is better than only local provision if and only if
(which is equivalent to ), which is20.85 ≥ 20.83 2 0.50 ln b b ≥ 1.04
true unless local provision is almost as efficient as federal provision.
Mixed.—The vote of a type i voter in district d at the federal level is
The minimum possible vote is thereforemax [i, (d 1 0.25)/b]. 1/4b.
Voter (i, d) votes for a level of public expenditures less than or equal
to v if and only if
d 1 0.25 { }v ≥ max i, ⇐⇒ i ≤ v and d ≤ vb 2 0.25 .[ ]b
One can show that if the outcome is equivalent to only federalb ≥ 1.5,
provision. The equilibrium level of federal expenditures for b P
is graphed in figure 2.[1, 1.5]
Aggregate welfare.—The shape of aggregate welfare as a function of b
is shown in figure 3. When b increases, welfare first decreases and then
increases, which is the opposite of example 1. Also in contrast to example
1, provision at both the local and federal levels is always dominated by
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Fig. 3.—The variation in social welfare in the mixed system as a function of b in example
2.
provision only at the federal level (and a fortiori by the best of provisions
only at the local level or only at the federal level).
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored a new framework for studying the po-
litical economy of federal mandates. The basic insight is that even
though voters are forward-looking and anticipate the effects of a federal
mandate in changing local policy, incentives under majority rules may
lead to adoption of federal mandates that make more voters worse off
than better off. Local districts that would have a high policy level anyway
are unaffected, but voters from districts that would have adopted a low
level of provision of the local public good are made worse off. Surpris-
ingly, the loss of efficiency due to the presence of a federal government
can be even greater when federal provision of the public good is more
efficient than local provision. Of course, our model abstracts from many
features of reality, such as the roles of politicians or of interest groups.
At the very least, we show that those groups that have a private interest
in concentrating power at the federal level find a powerful ally in the
voting behavior of the electorate.
We plan to extend our simple model in a number of directions. First,
we shall allow for externalities between districts; that is, the utility of
voter (i, d) will be of the type In this case, localu (y , … , y ) 2 y .id 1 D d
decisions are strategically linked to each other since voter preferences
are contingent on the policy decisions of other districts, and the formal
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analysis is significantly complicated. Second, we would like to introduce
in the model local agenda-setting monopolists a` la Romer and Rosenthal
(1979), who argue that proposal power for local referenda rests in the
hands of bureaucrats who have preferences that differ from those of
the median voter. Then one can show that federal mandates determined
by majority rule can dilute the power of local agenda-setting “policy
monopolists” since policy monopolists need a low–status quo policy in
order to give them agenda power. Federal mandates effectively raise the
status quo, which reduces (in some cases completely nullifying) leverage
of local policy monopolists, leading to a moderation of local policies
(Cre´mer and Palfrey 1999a). A third interesting extension is to allow
voters to vote with their feet as well as in the voting booth, as in the
Tiebout model of interjurisdictional equilibrium. This will make the
preferences in each district more homogeneous and presumably alter
the incentives of low-demand districts to accept federal mandates, since
a very large proportion of their electorate would oppose them.
More generally, this paper is part of a larger research program in
which we are attempting to study the interplay between politics at the
local level and at the federal level. In previous work (Cre´mer and Palfrey
1996, 1999b), we study the constitutional stage in this light. We show
that citizens will vote to transfer power from the local to the federal
level after determining in which of these two levels their views are more
likely to prevail. In the present paper, we assume that power has already
been allocated between governmental levels and show how voters will
use federal mandates in order to impose their preferred policies locally.
This approach is in sharp contrast with most of the literature on fed-
eralism, in both economics and political science. In economics, the study
of federalism, whether in the fiscal federalism literature or in the more
recent regulation-type literature, models the local level through a rep-
resentative agent. Only in Tiebout-type models does the difference in
the tastes of the voters play a role, but the objective of the local gov-
ernment is given exogenously. In any case the equilibrium homogenizes
the tastes of the local population.
Peterson (1995) presents a useful summary of the political science
literature, which he divides into two strands. The “functional theory,”
based on normative principles, assumes that the allocation of respon-
sibilities is meant to manage externalities as efficiently as possible. Re-
distribution, which is a federal responsibility, plays an important role in
the analysis. It does assume that citizens are different, but this is not
exploited to study conflicts between citizens, at either the local or federal
level. The “legislative theory,” on the other hand, stresses the way in
which legislators try to serve the interests of their voters, in particular,
by maximizing the amount of pork barrel allocated to their districts,
which have a homogeneous population.
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Taking into consideration seriously the politics of the functioning of
a federal system, as we are trying to do, opens up a host of questions
and should eventually force a reconsideration of the theory of allocation
of responsibilities between different levels of government. For instance,
we have shown that it is in general detrimental to allow federal inter-
vention when there is little or no efficiency reason for doing so. However,
as argued in Section IIA, it is practically impossible to prevent in practice,
and some issues will be open to federal intervention even with minimal
external benefits or economies. A deeper study of this “delimitation
problem” would be very valuable and could help provide a bridge be-
tween previous normative approaches and our positive approach. This
would require a model with multiple issues and an equilibrium in which
some issues involve federal intervention and others do not.
Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is an immediate consequence of the following two lemmas.
Lemma A1. For any F, voter (i, d) has a unique dominant strategy in the second
stage of the voting game: voting for his or her favorite policy on As a[F, 1 `).
consequence, for all F and d.∗x (F ) p max {F, m }d d
Proof. The issue space is one-dimensional, and preferences of the voters are
single-peaked over Therefore, the standard results on majority voting[F, 1 `).
apply (see, e.g., Moulin 1980; Border and Jordan 1983). Q.E.D.
To save on notation, we denote the ideal policy of voter (i, d) by t.
Lemma A2. Voting t is the unique dominant strategy in the first stage of the
voting game for voter (i, d).
Proof. The strategy of the proof is to show that voter (i, d) has a dominant
strategy of voting t if and also has a dominant strategy of voting t ift ≥ m t !d
Therefore, the voter has a dominant strategy of voting t even though he orm .d
she does not know md.
Case 1: Denote by [t2, t1] the interval in which the voter can make thet ≥ m .d
federal standard vary through the choice of his or her vote, given the profile
of other votes. That is, t2 is the largest vote among the votes of the(N 2 1)/2th
other voters and t1 is the largest vote among the votes of the largest(N 1 1)/2th
voters, where N is the total number of voters. To show that voting t is a dominant
strategy, we show that whatever t2 and t1, voting t is an optimal strategy. If
then the voter has no influence on the vote, and voting t is optimal.2 1t p t ,
Assume, therefore, that and consider the following cases. (a) : In2 1 2t ! t , t ! t
this case, the best possible federal standard the voter can obtain is t2, which
results from voting t. (b) : In this case, the voter can obtain the federal2 1t P [t , t ]
standard by voting t, which will result in outcome t for district d, sinceF p t
(c) : In this case, the best possible federal1max {F, m } p max {t, m } p t. t 1 td d
standard the voter can obtain is t1, which results from voting t.
To see that voting t is the only dominant strategy, assume first that the voter
chooses a vote Suppose that the profile of other votes yields an intervalv 1 t.
[t2, t1] such that In this case voter (i, d) will obtain the outcome2 1t ! t ! t ! v.
t1, which is worse than what he or she could have obtained by voting t. Alter-
natively, suppose that voter (i, d) had voted and the profile of other votesv ! t
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yields Then the outcome is whereas voting t would2 1t ! t ! t . max {v, m } ! t,d
have resulted in t.
Case 2: For any vote the outcome of the two-period game ist ! m . v ≤ m ,d d
so voting t yields the same outcome as any other There-2max (m , t ) 1 t, v ≤ m .d d
fore, suppose that There are four possible subcases. First, if then2 1v 1 m . t p t ,d
voting t or v yields the same outcome. Second, if then the outcome2 1t ! t ≤ m ,d
is md whether voter (i, d) votes t or v, so t is at least as good a voting strategy
as v. Third, if then voting v is strictly worse than voting t. Finally, if2 1t ! m ! t ,d
then voter (i, d) obtains t2 by voting t and obtains2 1 2m ! t ! t , max (v, t ) ≥d
by voting v, so voting t is at least as good as voting v.2t
To see that voting t is the only dominant strategy, consider any and somev 1 t
profile of other votes yielding [t2, t1], such that In this case2 1m ! t ! t ! t ! v.d
the outcome would be t1, which is worse than t2, which he could have obtained
by voting t, a contradiction. Alternatively, consider and some profile ofv ! t
other votes yielding Then the outcome is whereas2 1t ! m ! t ! t . max {v, m } ! t,d d
voting t would have resulted in the voter’s ideal policy, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma A3. Voting t is the unique dominant strategy in the first stage of the
voting game for voter (i, d), given that F is determined by the median of the
median votes of the first stage.
Proof. Fix a voter (i, d) and define F2 to be equal to the highest(D 2 1)/2th
median of votes in the other districts, and F1 to be equal to the (D 1 1)/2th
highest median of votes in the other districts. Voters of district d can by their
vote induce any outcome in the interval [F2, F1]. Let be the2t (n 2 1)/2thd d
highest vote of the other voters in district d and be the highest1t (n 1 1)/2thd d
vote of the other voters in district d, where nd is the number of voters in district
d. Whatever his vote, voter (i, d) cannot move the median vote in district d
outside of the interval 2 1[t , t ].d d
If voter (i, d) cannot affect the outcome sd by his vote
2 1 2 1[F , F ] ∩ [t , t ] p M,d d
in the first round, so voting t is weakly optimal.
If let and Then2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1[F , F ] ∩ [t , t ] ( M, t p max {F , t } t p min {F , t }.d d d d
By changing his or her vote in the first round,2 1 2 1 2 1[F , F ] ∩ [t , t ] p [t , t ].d d
voter (i, d) can effectively choose any federal standard in the interval [t2, t1],
and the same arguments as in the proof of lemma A2 carry through. Q.E.D.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let us call t2 the smallest federal policy that voter (i, d) can obtain and t1 the
largest one, and consider the following cases. (By the assumptions that all types
are different, we need consider only strict inequalities.)
Case 1: Whatever (i, d)’s vote, the local policy will be equal to thel 2m ! t .d
federal policy. (a) If the voter would like the federal policy to be t2. Anyf 2t ! t ,id
vote less than or equal to t2, in particular will obtain this result.l fmax (m , t ),d id
(b) If the voter would like the federal policy to be t1. Any vote greaterf 1t 1 t ,id
than or equal to t1, in particular will obtain this result. (c) Iff l ft p max (m , t ),id d id
the voter can obtain his or her preferred policy—a level of public2 f 1t ! t ! t ,id
service equal to entirely paid out of federal funds—by votingf ft t pid id
l fmax (m , t ).d id
Case 2: Whatever (i, d)’s vote, the local policy will be By lemmal 1 lm 1 t . m .d d
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1, the voter would like federal spending to be as high as possible, that is to say,
equal to t1. He can obtain this by voting for the policy l f l 1max (m , t ) ≥ m 1 t .d id d
Case 3: The voter can choose any local policy in the intervall 2 1m P (t , t ).d
Because these policies are also implementable as federal policies, voterl 1(m , t ).d
(i, d) will want to ensure that they are and hence will choose a federal policy
in that interval: (a) If the best attainable policy for the voter is whichf l lt ! m , m ,id d d
can be obtained by voting (b) If the best attainablel l f f 1m p max (m , t ). t 1 t ,d d id id
policy for the voter is t1, which can be obtained by voting (c)f l ft p max (m , t ).id d id
If the best attainable policy for the voter is which can be ob-f l 1 ft P (m , t ), t ,id d id
tained by voting f l ft p max (m , t ).id d id
This proves that we have identified a first-stage dominant strategy equilibrium.
We must still prove that there is only one dominant strategy equilibrium.
1. Consider first the case (a) Assume that the vote v of voter (i, d)l fm ! t :d id
is strictly greater than Then if the federal policy would be t1,f f 2 1t . t ! t ! t ! v,id id
which is farther away from his preferred federal (and local) policy than t2,ft id
which would have been chosen if he had voted (b) If thel f fmax (m , t ). v ! t ,d id id
voter would obtain a suboptimal policy, v, whereas he could have obtained his
first-best optimal federal policy, whenf 2 f 1t , v ! t ! t ! t .id id
2. Consider next the case (a) If the voter would force a federalf l lt ! m : m ! v,id d d
policy greater than if whereas he could have obtained the federall l 2m m ! t ! v,d d
policy which is closer to his preferred policy by votingl f lm , t , m pd id d
(b) If the local policy will be as it would be if v hadl f l lmax (m , t ). v ! m , m ,d id d d
been equal to However, if the federal policy would be t2,l 2 1 lm . v ! t ! t ! m ,d d
whereas we know from lemma 1 that the voter would prefer it to be whichlm ,d
it would be if he or she had voted lm .d
This proves the result.
D. Computations for Example 1
Induced preferences.—If the public good were provided entirely at the federal level
voter (i, d) would vote for a level of federally funded public goods(y p 0),d
∗Fs (i) p arg max i ln s 2 s p i.
s≥0
Given a level of public funding s, voter (i, d)’s preferred local provision of public
goods is From the results of the previous section, given∗Ls (i) p max {(i/b) 2 s, 0}.
a level s of federally funded public goods s, the level of public goods in district
d will be equal to Therefore, voter (i, d)’s dominant strategy inmax[s, d/2b].
the first round is to vote for a level of federal expenditures equal to
max [i, d/2b].
Only federal provision.—If there were provision only at the federal level, the
outcome would be the median of the preferred level of public goods, taken
over all voters. One finds6 and by integration an aggregate social∗s . 0.19,
welfare of 20.61.
Only local provision.—If there were only local provision, district d would have
a level of public good equal to By integration, one computes the averaged/2b.
welfare in district d, which is equal to and aggregate social[d ln (d/2be)]/2,
welfare, which is (approximately) equal to Therefore, it is20.55 2 0.25 lnb.
6 All numerical calculations were done through the Maple engine integrated in Scientific
WorkPlace.
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Fig. A1.—Distribution of votes for federal expenditures in example 1
better to have only a local level than only a federal level if (see fig. 1b ≤ 1.26
in the text).
Provision at both the federal and local levels.—We begin by computing the distri-
bution of votes for federal expenditures. Let G(v) be the measure of voters who
will vote for federal expenditures less than or equal to : (1) All thev P [0, 1]
voters in districts such that have a vote less than or equal to v. This is ad ≤ v
total measure of v voters. (2) In districts such that
d ≤ v ! d ⇐⇒ v ≤ d ≤ 2bv,
2b
a proportion of the voters have a vote less than or equal to v (in thesev/d
districts a voter has a vote less than or equal to v if and only if ). There arei ≤ v
two subcases: (a) : All districts satisfy Hence the measure of voters2bv ≥ 1 d ≤ 2bv.
in these districts is equal to the integral with respect to d of between v andv/d
one, that is, 2v ln v. (b) : In this case the measure of voters is equal to2bv ! 1
the integral with respect to d of between v and 2bv, that is, 2v ln 2b. (3)v/d
In districts such that for all i we have hence therev ! d/2b, max [i, d/2b] 1 v;
will be no vote less than or equal to v.
Putting this all together yields
1
G(v) p v ln e min 2b, .( )[ ]v
In figure A1 we graph G(v) for the case of The horizontal axis isb p 1.50.
a level of federal expenditure, and the vertical axis the proportion of voters
who will have a vote smaller than this level.
The curved line is and the straight line isy p v 2 v ln v p v ln (e/v) y p
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Fig. A2.—Variation in aggregate welfare as a function of b in example 1
so that G(v) is the lower envelope of these two curves. In equilibrium,v ln (2be),
the outcome of the first stage is the policy for which that is, theG(v) p 0.50,
solution to which is when evaluated at∗ ∗v ln (2be) p 0.50, v p 0.24 b p 1.50.
Notice that as b decreases, that is, as local expenditures become more efficient, the
straight line rotates toward the right and the level of federal expenditures increases!
Similarly, as b increases, the straight line rotates toward the left and the level
of federal expenditures decreases, up to the unique value of such that∗b 1 1
For values of b lower than b∗, s∗ is constant and is∗s ln (2b e) p s ln (e/s) p 0.5.
given implicitly as the unique root of in the region [0, 1], ors ln (e/x) p 0.50
approximately Solving numerically gives Aggregate social∗ ∗s p 0.19. b p 2.68.
welfare under the mixed regime is obtained by integrating the expected welfare
over all districts, and figure A2 shows its variation as a function of b. Notice that
welfare is not necessarily decreasing in b as discussed in the Introduction: when
it is small, welfare increases with b. That is, greater cost efficiency (at the local
level) can lead to lower aggregate welfare.
The computations for example 2 are very similar in spirit and are available
in a previous version of the paper, which the authors will be happy to provide
on request.
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